Before You Begin

1. Why has North Korea been trying for more than two decades to achieve a nuclear weapons capability?

2. If incentive-based diplomacy had been pursued initially, would it have had a chance of resolving the issue before North Korea acquired nuclear weapons?

3. Is the Agreed Framework a good arrangement? Is the agreement an example of appeasement or of diplomatic and peaceful management of an international problem?

4. How did President George W. Bush’s labeling North Korea a member of the “axis of evil” change U.S.–North Korean relations? How did five years of confrontation policy by the Bush administration contribute to security in East Asia and the world?

5. Was the deal reached in February 2007 another form of “appeasement” or a new hope for resolution of the issue? Did this deal send the wrong message to other states hoping to produce nuclear weapons?

6. Which foreign policy options are available to the Obama administration in dealing with North Korea?

7. What does U.S. policy on North Korea teach us about nuclear proliferation in general?

Introduction: Surprising Intelligence

In March 1984 satellite images of North Korea revealed a nuclear reactor under construction at Yongbyon, one hundred kilometers north of the capital, Pyongyang. The photographs shocked the Reagan administration, as this small but militarily powerful communist country in East Asia might be preparing to produce some of the world’s deadliest weapons. The images also showed a reactor-type chimney rising from the site. In June 1984, additional
intelligence identified a cooling tower, limited power lines, and electrical grid connections for the local transfer of energy. Analysts suggested that the reactor probably used uranium and graphite, both of which were available locally. This evidence could not establish conclusively that North Korea had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons; further intelligence in 1986, however, showed the construction of buildings similar to reprocessing plants used for separating plutonium, a step needed to produce atomic weapons. That same year, new photographs revealed circular craters of darkened ground, assumed to be the residue of high-explosive tests. The pattern suggested a technique used to detonate a nuclear device. A check of earlier photographs revealed the aftereffects of similar tests since 1983.¹

When intelligence sources discovered construction in 1988 of a fifty-megawatt-capacity reactor—one much larger than the reactor photographed in 1984—the United States became even more alarmed. Estimates held that the older, smaller reactor could produce enough plutonium for up to six weapons a year, whereas the larger plant would make enough for up to fifteen weapons. Finally confident of the existence of a nuclear program, the administration of George H. W. Bush approached Soviet and Chinese officials in February 1989 and Japanese and South Korean authorities in May 1989 about putting pressure on North Korea to meet its obligations as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The administration specifically wanted North Korea to sign a safeguards agreement allowing inspections of its nuclear facilities.² Thus began more than two decades of roller-coaster U.S.–North Korean relations concerning nuclear nonproliferation.

**Background: North Korea’s Nuclear Quest**

The Korean Peninsula was ruled as a single entity from the time the Shilla Kingdom unified it in the seventh century until the end of World War II.³ Japan colonized Korea in 1910, but when Japan surrendered in 1945, the Soviet Union and United States temporarily divided Korea at the 38th parallel. Thus a communist system evolved in the north, and a capitalist system in the south. Soon thereafter, the peninsula experienced the Korean War. Fought between communist North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, DPRK) and anticommunist South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) for domination of the peninsula, the war lasted from June 1950 to July 1953 and stands out as a major proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union.⁴ The principal combatants included on one side Australia, Canada, South Korea,
### Timeline

**Key Developments in U.S.–North Korean Relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The Soviet Union supplies North Korea with a small, experimental nuclear reactor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1984</td>
<td>Satellite images of North Korea reveal a nuclear reactor under construction at Yongbyon, one hundred kilometers north of the capital, Pyongyang.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>North Korea accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>U.S. intelligence identifies the construction of a large-capacity reactor in North Korea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The United States leads in calling on North Korea to meet its obligation to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>The United States announces its withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms from the Korean Peninsula.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1991</td>
<td>North Korea and South Korea sign the Basic Agreement, concerning the end of hostilities between them, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, agreeing to forgo nuclear weapons–related activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1992</td>
<td>North Korea concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program escalates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1993</td>
<td>Political and military issues erode North Korea’s relations with South Korea and the United States. As a result, North Korea declares its intent to withdraw from the NPT in ninety days.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>The United States eases tensions with North Korea by offering to hold high-level talks on nuclear issues. The North suspends its withdrawal from the NPT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1994</td>
<td>The CIA asserts that North Korea may have built one or two nuclear weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 13, 1994</td>
<td>North Korea announces its withdrawal from the IAEA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 15, 1994</td>
<td>Former president Jimmy Carter negotiates a deal in which Pyongyang confirms its willingness to freeze its nuclear program and resume high-level talks with the United States.</td>
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<td>June 20, 1994</td>
<td>The Clinton administration sends a letter to the North Korean government stating its willingness to proceed in freezing their nuclear program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 8, 1994</td>
<td>North Korean leader Kim Il Sung dies. He is succeeded by his son Kim Jong Il.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 1994</td>
<td>The United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework in Geneva. The agreement involves dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear program in return for heavy oil supplies and light water reactors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea, and the United States form the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as part of the Agreed Framework.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996–2000</td>
<td>North Korea and the United States hold several rounds of talks concerning the North’s missile program. Washington suggests that Pyongyang adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The talks prove unproductive.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>North Korea generates unfavorable international attention by testing the Taepo Dong I rocket, which flies over Japan. The missile has a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 15, 2000</td>
<td>At a historic summit, North Korea and South Korea agree to resolve the issue of reunification for the Korean Peninsula.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 19, 2000</td>
<td>Encouraged by the Korean summit, the United States eases sanctions on North Korea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 29, 2002</td>
<td>President George W. Bush labels North Korea a member of a so-called axis of evil. The North Korean government reacts negatively.</td>
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(continued)
### Timeline (continued)

**Key Developments in U.S.–North Korean Relations**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 3–5, 2002</td>
<td>James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visits North Korea and informs officials that the United States is aware of its clandestine nuclear program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 16, 2002</td>
<td>North Korea admits to having had a clandestine program to enrich uranium (and plutonium) for nuclear weapons development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>KEDO stops shipping oil to North Korea. The IAEA asks North Korea for clarification on its nuclear program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>North Korea responds to KEDO’s oil stoppage by restarting its frozen nuclear reactor and orders IAEA inspectors out of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10, 2003</td>
<td>North Korea withdraws from the NPT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>At a meeting held in Beijing with China, South Korea, and the United States, North Korea announces that it has nuclear weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003–2004</td>
<td>Negotiations involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States fail to produce any effective results.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 4–5, 2006</td>
<td>North Korea conducts seven missile tests, including a long-range Taepodong II.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 15, 2006</td>
<td>The UN Security Council unanimously votes to impose sanctions that ban selling missile-related material to North Korea by all member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 3, 2006</td>
<td>North Korea conducts its first nuclear detonation tests ever. The world condemns this provocative act.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 14, 2006</td>
<td>The UN Security Council unanimously votes to impose both military and economic sanctions on North Korea to protest the nuclear tests.</td>
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Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other allies under a UN mandate, and on the other side North Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union sided with North Korea, but it did not provide direct military support in the form of troops. After three years of fighting, a ceasefire established a demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the 38th parallel, a demarcation still defended by substantial North Korean forces on one side and South Korean and U.S. forces on the other. More than fifty years after the fighting, the adversaries have yet to sign a peace treaty.

North Korea is ruled by one of the last remaining communist regimes and has had only two leaders in more than a half-century: Kim Il Sung, from 1948 till his death in 1994, and his son Kim Jong Il, who succeeded him. The Korean Worker’s Party of North Korea is the last example of a classic Stalinist, communist party. The regime in North Korea is extremely autocratic, and the country has perhaps the most closed political system in the world. After decades of mismanagement, the North relies heavily on

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<tr>
<td>February 13, 2007</td>
<td>Announcement comes from the six-party talks, continuing in Beijing, that North Korea has agreed to freeze its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon in return for economic and diplomatic concessions from the other parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>As an important step in the denuclearization process, North Korea announces its nuclear assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>United States removes North Korea from its sponsors of terrorism list; in return, North Korea agrees to allow inspectors in its key nuclear sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>North Korea fires a rocket carrying a satellite. Suspected for testing a long-range missile by regional countries and criticized by the UN Security Council, North Korea declares it will not participate in six-party talks anymore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>North Korea tests a nuclear device second time in its history, protests from all around the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>North Korea claims to work for ending hostilities with U.S. and nuclear-free Korean peninsula.</td>
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international food aid to feed its population and avert mass starvation.\textsuperscript{7} It is estimated that nearly two million people may have died of famine from 1995 to 1998.\textsuperscript{8}

Despite severe economic crises over the last two decades and widespread famine, North Korea continues to feed one of the largest armies in the world, with more than a million personnel.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, North Korea’s interest in nuclear power apparently began in the 1960s, when Kim Il Sung asked China to transfer nuclear technology to North Korea after China’s first nuclear tests. Chinese leader Mao Zedong rejected such requests in 1964 and in 1974. The Soviet Union also refused to transfer nuclear technology to North Korea, but in 1977 the Soviets gave it a small, experimental reactor and insisted that it be placed under IAEA safeguards.\textsuperscript{10} In all likelihood the North persisted in efforts to go nuclear for two primary reasons: the Korean War experience and South Korean efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. During the war, North Korea experienced the threat of U.S. nuclear power, a menace that remained in Pyongyang’s consciousness after the war concluded. According to one observer, “No country has been the target of more American nuclear threats than North Korea—at least seven since 1945.” South Korea had attempted to gain nuclear weapons in the 1970s, but the United States prevented it from doing so. That venture by the South strongly influenced North Korean policy makers’ security perceptions and pushed them toward seeking the nuclear option. In 1995 Walter Slocombe, U.S. under secretary of defense for policy in the Clinton administration, itemized the threats that North Korea’s going nuclear poses, saying that it

- could be coupled with the oversized conventional force to extort or blackmail South Korea and greatly increase the costs of a war on the Korean Peninsula;
- could ignite a nuclear arms race in Asia;
- could undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system of inspections; and
- could lead to the export of nuclear technologies and components to pariah states and terrorists worldwide, and could project the nuclear threat across most of Northeast Asia if the government was successful in upgrading missile delivery systems.\textsuperscript{11}

For these reasons, nuclear proliferation by North Korea became one of the foremost foreign policy challenges for the United States in the late twentieth century, and it continues to be in the current century.
The Policy of George H. W. Bush

In the 1980s and early 1990s most senior officials in the first Bush administration—including national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, his deputy and later CIA director Robert Gates, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz—believed that diplomatic means would not work with North Korea. Domestic political reasons, such as pressure to focus on the economy, along with Congress’s and the foreign policy establishment’s obvious distaste for dealing with North Korea, reinforced their reluctance to employ cooperative measures. Because Washington did not want to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, it adopted a crime-and-punishment approach that arguably led to crisis and subsequent deadlock.12 In other words, from 1989 through 1992 the United States primarily, though not exclusively, used the stick rather than the carrot to deal with North Korea.

The Bush administration relied on the IAEA to monitor North Korea’s nuclear program and the UN Security Council to enforce compliance with the NPT, to which North Korea had acceded in 1985 on the advice of the Soviet Union.13 Although Pyongyang was supposed to sign the IAEA safeguards treaty within eighteen months of signing the NPT, it delayed for six years and signed the agreement only in January 1992. In other words, through various actions (or inaction) the North Korean government gave the impression that it had an ongoing interest in producing nuclear weapons.

Efforts by the Bush administration significantly influenced North Korea’s ultimate signing of the IAEA safeguards agreement. By 1990 South Korea and the United States both worried that North Korea might already have developed one or two nuclear weapons. Unknown to U.S. officials, Soviet intelligence also had been receiving signals about the North Korean project. A KGB document from February 1990 (revealed in 1992) suggested that the North actually had completed a bomb:

Scientific and experimental design work to create a nuclear weapon is continuing in the DPRK. . . . According to information received, development of the first atomic explosive device has been completed at the DPRK Center for Nuclear Research, located in the city of Yongbyon in Pyongan-pukto Province. At present there are no plans to test it, in the interests of concealing from world opinion and from the controlling international organizations the actual fact of the production of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. The KGB is taking additional measures to verify the above report.14
Beginning in 1991, South Korea and the United States implemented different elements of an integrated political, economic, and military campaign designed to persuade North Korea to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. U.S. actions appear, however, to have been somewhat ad hoc, developing according to circumstances, most notably in reaction to getting nowhere by using the stick alone.

During 1991 U.S. strategy concerning North Korean nuclearization consisted of four primary elements. The first was an unequivocal statement of a reduced U.S. military position on the Korean Peninsula. In 1990 the United States had initiated limited troop withdrawals from South Korea as part of its East Asian Strategic Initiative (and had taken steps to ease the trade embargo on the North). Then, in part because the cold war was coming to an end, the United States announced in September 1991 the withdrawal of nuclear warheads, shells, and bombs from South Korea. Second, Washington reaffirmed its security relationship with South Korea, to convince the North Koreans that delaying inspections would gain them nothing; this was conceived as an assertive element to balance the more pacific announcement about its forces and nuclear arsenal. Third, the annual U.S.–South Korean Team Spirit Military Exercise, which had been condemned by North Korea as provocative, was suspended for a year. Fourth, U.S. officials agreed to begin to direct talks with North Korea, albeit only for a single session, with more to follow if North Korea cooperated and allowed nuclear inspections.

This diplomatic approach produced some relatively positive consequences. In December 1991 North Korea and South Korea began talks at the level of prime minister that resulted in two agreements, which were welcomed by the United States. The Basic Agreement, signed on December 10, appeared to provide a strong basis for ending hostility between the two Koreas. Its main terms are as follows:

- Mutual recognition of each other’s systems and an end to mutual interference, vilification, and subversion.
- Mutual efforts “to transform the present state of armistice into a solid peace,” with continued observance of the armistice until this is accomplished.
- A mutual commitment not to use force against each other and the implementation of confidence-building measures and large-scale arms reductions.
- Economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges, free correspondence between divided families, and the reopening of roads and railroads severed at the border.
After signing the Basic Agreement, the North and South reached a nuclear accord in only six days. The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula states that both countries agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, process, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or “process nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities.”

In January 1992 North Korea concluded a safeguards agreement for inspection of its nuclear facilities by the IAEA, another result of a diplomatic initiative. At the end of April, almost everything stood ready for inspections to begin at Yongbyon.

Some observers argue that the fundamental lesson from the negotiations was that diplomacy works when dealing with North Korea about its nuclear program, so such an approach should continue. According to this line of argument, the gradual, nuanced strategy of pressure and incentives had persuaded the North to allow inspections. Other observers argue, however, that the Bush administration had not provided any substantial incentive to the North to truly convince policy makers there to comply fully with the agreement. In fact, they say that the administration’s handling of North Korea caused the deadlock that led to the more serious upheavals years later. This line of argument also suggests that North Korea actually wanted to open direct talks with the United States, to obtain assistance to ameliorate its economic problems and to build light water reactors to solve its energy problem. Quite possibly because of a reluctance to show the carrot, the Bush administration preferred to ignore North Korea’s true goals.

Analysis of the situation in greater depth suggests that it is very likely that North Korea attempted to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to lure the United States into direct talks and into supplying it with light water reactors. The United States and South Korea, however, perceived the nuclear threat to be real. The differences between Washington’s and Pyongyang’s perceptions of the North’s nuclear program stood during this phase as the main obstacles to a genuine resolution of North Korean nuclearization. Administration hawks—among them the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter—lobbied hard for military action against North Korea. In a more general sense, the administration had assembled a foreign policy team whose members believed that diplomacy would be wasted on North Korea because its leadership understood only the use of force. This view may have been indicative of a Munich syndrome, a disposition against appeasement of presumably dangerous states. Approaching elections also encouraged the Bush administration to play hardball with North Korea.
From Bush to Clinton

The agreements reached between the two Koreas, along with the North’s announcement that it would allow IAEA inspections, represented two quite positive developments in terms of nonproliferation and peace on the Korean Peninsula. As early as February 1992, however, CIA director Gates alleged—and, it turned out, with good reason—that the North had not been honest about its nuclear program. After Pyongyang accepted inspections, the head of the IAEA, Hans Blix, traveled to North Korea in May 1992 for a guided tour of its nuclear facilities in advance of the formal IAEA inspection teams. Although North Korea aimed to show Blix the most nonthreatening aspects of its program, large buildings suspected of being used for processing plutonium turned out to be exactly that. Blix’s visit served to confirm suspicions that the North’s nuclear weapons program might still be active. Later in 1992 the IAEA revealed that North Korea had not been truthful about its activities. Pyongyang had declared that it had processed ninety grams of plutonium for research purposes only. Analysis by the IAEA, however, revealed that it had processed plutonium at least three times—in 1989, 1990, and 1991. A sample of nuclear waste, supposedly from the separation process, did not match any of the separated plutonium, which led the IAEA to believe that more plutonium than was revealed had to have been produced. Neither the IAEA nor the CIA, however, could determine how much plutonium the North possessed at the time.

In 1993 the dialogue between North Korea and the actors trying to denuclearize it began gradually to collapse. In January the IAEA began informing the international community that it might ask to inspect two other suspected North Korean sites, an unusual measure for the organization. The CIA provided the IAEA with photographs of certain sites that had not been inspected and that it thought might contain the hidden plutonium. North Korea, as anticipated, rejected further inspections on the grounds that the suspected structures were only conventional military buildings and that permitting further IAEA inspections would be a breach of sovereignty and a threat to North Korean security. The IAEA’s desire for additional investigations isolated North Korea and set back the newly developing relations between Pyongyang and the world.

Despite the cooperation agreements between the North and South, by February 1993 growing evidence of the North’s undocumented nuclear activities, combined with other events, reduced hopes for an amicable solution to the problem of North Korean nuclearization. In fall 1992 South Korea had revealed evidence of a North Korean spy ring in the ROK. The South Korean Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) asserted that a conspiracy against the
South—involving labor organizations and even lawmakers in the National Assembly—intended to disrupt its politics to facilitate unification with the North in 1995, an action that was viewed unfavorably in the South. The ANSP alleged that more than four hundred people were involved in the spy operation. North Korea rejected the allegations.

Although South Korea had a legitimate right to investigate espionage against it, the timing of the announcement could not have been worse in the context of long-term relations with the North. Bilateral talks and cooperation were canceled and their future prospects significantly damaged. As might have been expected, the suspended Team Spirit military exercises resumed. In spite of the spy ring incident, it is difficult to understand why South Korea and the United States would renew the military exercise. North Korea had long protested Team Spirit and had even used it as an excuse for delaying imminent IAEA inspections. Put simply, the gains hard won by diplomacy were lost as a result of the Team Spirit exercises. In fact, just a day before the exercises began, the “Dear Leader,” Kim Jong Il, heightened tensions all around when he ordered that “the whole country, all the people and the entire army shall, on March 9, 1993, switch to a state of readiness for war.”

Thus the diplomatic “spring” of 1992 gradually eroded in 1993. After six months of IAEA inspections, the North had obtained no tangible benefits from the process: no economic aid, no direct talks with the United States, no broader dialogue with the South, and no ability to verify that U.S. nuclear weapons had in fact been withdrawn from the South. The increasing demands from the IAEA and South Korea to allow short-notice inspections of virtually any military site in North Korea, combined with the spy ring incident and Team Spirit, led some observers to speculate that the South’s moves were designed to force the North to back away from negotiations. Despite all of these developments, it is not possible to place full blame for the disintegration of relations in 1993 with South Korea or the United States. The North had apparently violated international agreements and did not want to make additional concessions on denuclearization. The absence of any sign by the United States that it might be interested in rapprochement might also have contributed to the shift toward disintegrating relations. North Korea’s actions ultimately influenced U.S. and South Korean policy makers to revert to a hard-line approach.

**Withdrawal from the NPT and Reactor Refueling**

The Clinton administration inherited a developing crisis in its first days in office. By January 1993, North Korea already had begun maneuvering
around IAEA inspections. The administration did not, however, make any significant policy shifts, choosing instead to retain Bush administration policies, which stressed adherence to the NPT. This legalistic approach merely held that North Korea had certain obligations under the NPT and must therefore fulfill them. Direct talks with the North or benefits related to nonproliferation might come if the North complied with inspection requirements.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and officials from his office suggested initiating direct contact with Pyongyang in the form of a high-level delegation in early 1993 and offering the North Koreans concrete benefits as incentives to cooperate. They argued that if North Korea still refused to cooperate after getting the carrot, then the United States would use the stick of sanctions and possibly even military action. For the Clinton administration, this represented not appeasement but a rather balanced approach. One U.S. official described the policy as a “sugar-coated ultimatum.”27 President Bill Clinton did not pursue this option at first, because it seemed like rewarding the North for not doing something it should have already done. The conservative media and some members of Congress had been attacking the administration for its seemingly left-of-center disposition toward gays in the military, and conservatives argued that perceived weakness in dealing with North Korea was unacceptable among much of the public.

The first crisis for the Clinton administration began in March 1993 when, during the Team Spirit exercises, Pyongyang asserted that such operations endangered nonproliferation efforts and threatened its security. It announced its opposition to additional nuclear inspections on its territory, claiming that the IAEA worked for U.S. interests. That same month, North Korea stated its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in ninety days. Both the Clinton administration and the South Korean government of Kim Yong Sam were relatively new in March 1993 and not well prepared for such a development, but with the support of South Korea, the United States eased tensions by offering to hold talks with Pyongyang on nuclear issues. In return, North Korea suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June. Thus the Clinton administration effectively adopted the Defense Department’s previously articulated approach of direct, high-level talks, and North Korea attained one of its goals: to sit at the negotiating table with the United States. With this success, the North proposed to relinquish its entire nuclear program in return for light water reactors. The United States acknowledged the North’s interest but then stated that it should first comply with IAEA inspections and renew its dialogue with South Korea. The dialogue with the United States continued in
1993 but did not resolve any existing problems. The IAEA continued to have difficulties with North Korea. The IAEA referred the issue to the UN Security Council and even claimed that it would be better for North Korea to be excluded from the NPT than to compromise the treaty’s integrity.\textsuperscript{28}

The North ignited another crisis as the international community discussed what to do about matters already under review. While ideas about how to punish North Korea for its nuclear program preoccupied leading members of the world community, Pyongyang declared in May 1994 that the reactor would be refueled. This meant removing the existing rods, from which weapons-grade plutonium could then be produced.\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{The Carrot}

In response to North Korea’s decision to refuel, in early summer 1994 President Clinton threatened to halt the U.S. dialogue and impose economic sanctions, which would significantly damage the North’s already terrible economy. He also considered air strikes. The North announced that sanctions would mean war.\textsuperscript{30} Before implementing punitive action, the administration decided to take a diplomatic tack. Former president Jimmy Carter had previously communicated to the White House his interest in visiting North Korea to seek a peaceful solution to the looming nuclear crisis. The Reagan and Bush administrations had earlier rejected his requests to travel to North Korea.\textsuperscript{31} This time, however, Carter found support in the Oval Office. A White House official referred to Carter’s visit as an opportunity for “a face-saving resolution” to the tensions.\textsuperscript{32} Clinton did not designate Carter as an official U.S. representative, so he would travel to North Korea with the status of a private citizen. The State Department, however, briefed him and dispatched a career Foreign Service officer to accompany him. State Department spokesperson Michael McCurry pointed out that Carter would not be “carrying any formal message from the United States.”\textsuperscript{33}

The Carter mission had two primary goals: to defuse the immediate tensions related to the North Korean nuclear program and to jump-start the talks between the United States and North Korea. Carter left for Pyongyang on June 12, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA on June 13, and on June 16 the Clinton administration laid out its vision of economic sanctions. Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, called for restricting arms exports from North Korea, cutting UN assistance, and encouraging further diplomatic isolation. These measures would be followed by economic sanctions if the North did not comply with the IAEA inspection regime.
Carter’s diplomatic efforts, however, yielded positive results, with North Korea expressing a willingness to freeze its nuclear program and resume high-level talks with the United States. On June 20 the United States sent a letter to Pyongyang officially proposing such talks.34

The Carter visit elicited both praise and criticism. Conservatives perceived it as appeasement, and even some Democrats in the administration became outraged when Carter renounced the possible use of sanctions. One point cannot, however, be ignored: Carter’s visit prevented the use of force and perhaps a war with enormous costs. According to one State Department official, “If Jimmy Carter had not gone to Korea, we would have been damned close to war.”35 If the prevention of war is the criterion of success, then at least for the short term Carter’s mission must be regarded as a success indeed. Carter’s efforts led both sides to conclude that negotiations constituted the best option available to them, but Kim Il Sung’s death on July 8 delayed the start of talks that month. They instead began on August 5.

The Agreed Framework and KEDO

On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework to resolve the issues surrounding Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The agreement included a bilateral structure for negotiations—which represented a major change in the nature of U.S.–North Korean relations—and was to be implemented in phases, allowing the two sides to assess each other’s compliance at each step before moving on to the next. The Agreed Framework required North Korea to undertake the following:

- Eliminate its existing capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
- Resume full membership in the NPT, including complying completely with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which mandates the inspectors to investigate suspected nuclear waste sites and to place any nuclear material not previously identified under IAEA safeguards.
- Take steps to consistently execute the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- Engage in a dialogue with the South.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—a consortium of Japan, South Korea, and the United States officially established in March 1995 to coordinate the agreement—was by 2003 to provide two 1,000 megawatt, light water reactor power plants (priced around $4 billion) and supply North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to compensate for the capacity forfeited by freezing its graphite-modulated reactors. The United
States and North Korea agreed to open liaison offices in each other’s capitals and reduce barriers to trade and investment. The United States also agreed to provide formal assurances that it would not threaten North Korea with nuclear weapons. North Korean negotiator Kang Sok Ju remarked to his American counterpart, Robert Gallucci, that the North’s bargaining chip was continuing production of plutonium and preventing IAEA inspections if the United States did not comply with the agreement. In turn, U.S. leverage rested on the prospect of establishing political and economic ties valuable to North Korea.

The Agreed Framework was a loose agreement in the sense that its implementation was left to the states’ own volition. Implementation initially ran rather smoothly. In August 1998, however, North Korea launched over Japan a Taepo Dong 1 rocket with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers. Pyongyang announced that the rocket had successfully placed a small satellite into orbit, but that claim was contested by the U.S. Space Command. Japan responded to this invasion of its air space by suspending the signing of a cost-sharing agreement for the Agreed Framework’s light water reactor project until November 1998. The development came as a shock to the U.S. intelligence community, which admitted being surprised by North Korea’s advances in missile-staging technology. On October 1, 1998, U.S.–North Korean missile talks held in New York made little progress. The United States requested that Pyongyang terminate its missile programs in exchange for the lifting of some remaining economic sanctions. North Korea rejected the proposal, asserting that the lifting of sanctions was implicit in the Agreed Framework.

On November 12, 1998, President Clinton appointed former secretary of defense William Perry as his policy coordinator on North Korea. A policy review that Perry undertook noted that the situation in East Asia was not the same as it had been in 1994, when the Agreed Framework was signed. He observed that the North’s missile tests had substantially increased Japanese security concerns and that the passing of North Korea’s leadership to Kim Jong Il had created further uncertainty. On a more positive note, the new South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, had embarked on a policy of engagement with North Korea. Based on his policy review, Perry ultimately devised a two-path strategy. The first path involved a new, comprehensive, and integrated approach to negotiations. In return for the North’s full compliance with the NPT, Missile Technology Control Regime, and export of nuclear and missile technologies, Japan, South Korea, and the United States would reduce pressures that the North perceived as threatening. Perry argued that reduction of those threats would give the regime confidence about coexisting with other states in
the region. If the North did as it should, according to Perry, the United States should normalize relations and relax sanctions.

Perry’s second path focused on what to do if North Korea did not want to cooperate. If there was no chance of continuing relations with the North, the United States would sever relations, contain the threat, and enforce the provisions outlined in the first path. Perry’s report also observed that the North had complied with the NPT and had not produced plutonium in the preceding five years, which provided grounds for encouragement about the feasibility of the first path.

Overall, the first five years of the Agreed Framework reveal a mixed record. The North did not advance in producing nuclear weapons, but it did significantly improve its missile technology. The United States supplied crude oil as agreed, but the light water reactors remained far from being finished as scheduled. Maintaining the Agreed Framework was not to be an easy job.

The Critics

Clinton’s policy of “engagement” met severe criticism in Congress and from conservative columnists. Critics argued that it was unacceptable to compromise with a so-called rogue state that threatened U.S. allies. From that point of view, unless the North capitulated, coercion in general, sanctions in particular, and even military action would be preferred to negotiation. Moreover, considering North Korea’s economic problems, any deal effectively supported an already sinking regime. Putting together a deal such as the Agreed Framework, according to critics, was immoral and set a terrible precedent for other rogue states. In an October 1994 letter to Clinton, four Republicans on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations summed up the more critical view of policy at the time: “We are left wondering how to distinguish such a deal from U.S. submission to North Korean nuclear blackmail.” Other concerns focused on the timing of reciprocal concessions and actions under the framework.

Clinton administration officials and supporters of the Agreed Framework responded that although the United States made some concessions, the outcome, if successful, would meet U.S. strategic objectives. Key achievements for the United States as a result of the agreement were enumerated as follows: (1) being able to estimate the amount of plutonium produced by the North in the past and dismantling any nuclear weapons already produced; (2) convincing North Korea to halt its nuclear program; (3) keeping North Korea within the NPT and its safeguards agreement; (4) enticing the North out of international isolation; and (5) supporting stability and security in the region.
Largely through Ambassador Gallucci, the administration also countered the critics with six arguments. First, the framework did not amount to appeasement or, even worse, submission to blackmail because North Korea had made even more concessions than the United States. Second, the conditions the North agreed to fulfill met U.S. objectives, such as its remaining within the NPT and respecting obligations under the safeguards agreement. Third, the agreement pertained to the North’s past nuclear program and aimed to find plutonium already produced. Fourth, whether Pyongyang met the requirements of the safeguards agreement could be verified by IAEA and U.S. assets, and no benefits would be provided before proof of full compliance. Fifth, the agreement needed to be viewed as a compromise, meaning that significant but not unreasonable costs were entailed to obtain such benefits as reduction of the threat of nuclear proliferation and instability in Northeast Asia. Sixth, the agreement set a precedent only to the degree that other situations involve similar elements, an unlikely event.42

The United States, like other great powers before it, has tended toward a basic action-reaction pattern: “Our first reaction to somebody’s doing something we don’t like is to think of doing something unpleasant to them.”43 In partial contrast to that generalization, the Clinton administration’s Agreed Framework with North Korea on nuclear proliferation serves as an example of incentive-based diplomacy. Despite some legitimate criticisms, by signing the framework the United States accomplished its immediate goals at a bearable cost. The agreement, despite the political and financial problems of domestic criticism and the cost of supplying crude oil to North Korea, functioned until (for better or worse) President George W. Bush designated North Korea, Iraq, and Iran an “axis of evil” in 2002.

The Policy of George W. Bush

Dialogue with North Korea slowed as the new George W. Bush administration took some time to review policy toward it in early 2001. Although Republicans, including some Bush aides, engaged in harsh rhetoric about the North, after three months of review, the president announced in June 2001 that his administration would stick with the basic outlines of the existing policy in the form of the Agreed Framework. Lobbying by Japan and South Korea, combined with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s successful fending off of the more conservative Bush advisers, were influential in bringing about this decision.44
Although the administration reaffirmed its intent to supply the two light water reactors that the framework specified in return for North Korea’s restraint of its nuclear development, it found domestic opposition to fulfilling that requirement difficult to bear. From the beginning of the administration, some members of Congress and commentators in academia and the media argued repeatedly that one of the two reactors should be replaced with a thermal power station. The reasoning was that nuclear weapons-grade plutonium could be extracted from them. Another, hidden reason might have been the increasing cost of the heavy oil the United States had provided to North Korea since 1995, and which it was slated to continue to provide until the new reactors were completed. Because of the financial and organizational problems related to KEDO, analysts expected the reactors to be finished around 2010.

Republican partisans did not want to fund a regime that they believed was hostile to the United States. The South Korean government, which bore 70 percent of the construction costs for the two reactors, maintained its opposition to their replacement with thermal power stations because: (1) that would violate the most critical agreement between the United States and the North; (2) it would further delay the project and result in additional costs; and (3) it would be impossible for North Korea to extract plutonium of nuclear weapons grade from the light water reactors because, although extraction remains theoretically possible, it would not be able to obtain the extremely sophisticated reprocessing technology needed. North Korea also opposed such a change in the Agreed Framework. Although the Bush administration initially gave no indication of a significant change in U.S. policy, the simple act of reviewing the agreement was enough to upset the North. On March 17, 2001, the North Korean Central Broadcasting Station issued the following warning: “If the Bush administration feels it burdensome and troublesome to perform the Geneva Agreed Framework, we don’t need to be indefinitely bound by an agreement that is not honored. We will go on our way in case the agreement is not honored.” Rodong Sinmun, the state-controlled newspaper, observed, “North Korea would take ‘countermeasures’ if the United States does not perform its obligations under the agreement. We will also demand compensation for the delay in construction of the LWRs [light water reactors].” At the end of 2001, there appeared to be reason to believe that bilateral talks would continue, although the North was suspicious of a renewed dialogue.

Another year of tense relations between the United States and North Korea unfolded in 2002. The attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States transformed the Bush administration’s foreign policy into one that would deal
with unfriendly regimes more decisively, and if necessary, unilaterally and forcefully. The watershed event of 2002 for U.S.–North Korean relations occurred on January 29, when President Bush, in his State of the Union address, accused North Korea of being one of three members of a so-called axis of evil that threatened U.S. and even world security. In this highly controversial speech, Bush described North Korea as “a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. . . . The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most dangerous weapons.” Bush’s speech sent shock waves around the world, as leaders waited to see what it might mean in practice.

Shortly after the speech, the State Department and the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Thomas C. Hubbard, insisted that the president’s statement did not represent a policy shift. The United States, according to them, remained fully open to resuming bilateral talks with North Korea without any preconditions.

North Korea, however, responded harshly and directly to the speech with rhetoric aimed to match Bush’s:

Mr. Bush’s remarks clearly show what the real aim [sic] the U.S. sought when it proposed to resume talks with the DPRK recently. . . . We are sharply watching the United States [sic] moves that have pushed the situation to the brink of war after throwing away even the mask of “dialogue” and “negotiation.” . . . The option to strike impudently advocated by the United States is not its monopoly.

Thus, with Bush’s speech and Pyongyang’s reaction to it, what guarded hopes there were for a renewed diplomatic exchange between the United States and North Korea disappeared, at least for the foreseeable future.

In South Korea and Japan, various political groups accused the United States of destroying the North-South dialogue and threatening the peace in East Asia. Although the State Department, and Secretary Powell himself, asserted on several occasions that the United States was ready to resume a dialogue with North Korea at “any time, any place, or anywhere without preconditions,” that did not convince the North Koreans. A memorandum from President Bush stated that he would not certify North Korea’s compliance with the Agreed Framework; because of national security considerations, however, Bush waived the provision that would have prohibited Washington from funding KEDO. Continuation of that support under such hostile conditions, however, did not bring North Korea back to the negotiation table.
The United States warned North Korea in August 2002 to comply as soon as possible with IAEA safeguard procedures. The North replied that it would not do so for at least three more years. Developments that fall raised the tension between the United States and North Korea and led to the confrontation that continues today. In October, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited North Korea and presented U.S. concerns about its nuclear program as well as its ballistic missile program (which at the time the North Koreans themselves had delayed), export of missile components, conventional force posture, human rights violations, and overall humanitarian situation. Kelly informed Pyongyang that a comprehensive settlement addressing these issues might be the way to improve bilateral relations. North Korea called this approach “high-handed and arrogant” and maintained its noncooperative stance.51

More important, the United States announced on October 16 that North Korea had admitted to the existence of a clandestine program to enrich uranium (in addition to plutonium) for nuclear weapons, after Kelly had informed the North Koreans that the United States had knowledge of it. Such a serious violation of the Agreed Framework raised immediate and intense reactions around the world. In November, KEDO announced the suspension of oil deliveries, and the IAEA asked North Korea for clarification on its nuclear program. North Korea rejected these demands and announced that because of the halt to KEDO’s supply of oil, it would reopen the frozen nuclear reactors to produce electricity. In December, North Korea cut all seals on IAEA surveillance equipment on its nuclear facilities and materials and ordered inspectors out of the country.

North Korea continued to abrogate its international agreements with the announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003. The following month, the United States confirmed that North Korea had in December restarted a nuclear reactor previously frozen by the Agreed Framework. The North also conducted two missile tests in February and March 2003.52 Perhaps most ominous was an incident in which North Korea sent a fighter jet into South Korean airspace and shadowed a U.S. reconnaissance plane.53 Trilateral talks among China, North Korea, and the United States in April 2003 and six-party talks (with Japan, Russia, and South Korea) in September 2003 and February 2004 did not bring a resolution to the crisis.54 Little was produced diplomatically in 2004 and 2005. Leaders of the two nations occasionally railed against each other, while diplomats achieved next to nothing. In August 2004, in response to President Bush’s portraying Kim Jong Il as a
“tyrant,” North Korea described the president as an “imbecile” and a “tyrant that puts Hitler in a shade.” Then on September 28, North Korea announced that it had produced another nuclear weapon from eight thousand spent fuel rods for self-defense against U.S. nuclear threats. On September 13, 2005, six-party talks resumed. On September 19, another “historic” statement was issued that North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear activity and rejoin the NPT. This time the good atmosphere did not even survive a day: on September 20, North Korea declared it would not give up its nuclear program if light water reactors were not supplied. This eventually ended the fifth round of six-party talks, without progress, a month later.55

The international community experienced a more turbulent year concerning the North Korean nuclear program in 2006. Two major acts by the DPRK shocked observers: on July 4 and 5, the DPRK test-fired seven missiles including a Taepodong-2, whose suspected range covers the western coast of the United States. The UN Security Council responded quickly, on July 15, 2006, with unanimous Resolution 1695, which demanded that North Korea return to the six-party talks without preconditions, comply with the September 2005 joint statement “in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes,” and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards soon. In addition, the Security Council required all member states “to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes.”56

North Korea’s response to the sanctions was even more provocative. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapon test ever. Sending shock waves around the world, the DPRK administration argued that the test was against “U.S. military hostility.” The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718, condemning the action and demanding similar compromises from the DPRK. The UN also imposed military and economic sanctions.57

There were contending commentaries and intelligence about this test. On October 13, U.S. intelligence asserted that the air sample obtained from the test site contained radioactive material; yet the size of the explosion was less than one kiloton, which is quite small compared to nuclear detonations by other states, which usually ranged from ten to sixty kilotons.58 On the other hand, a recent comment by CIA director Michael Hayden suggests that the October 2006 test was a failure, and the United States does not recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapon–maintaining state.59 Obviously, the DPRK conducted some kind of a nuclear detonation, but the success of the test is open to debate.
While the international community was upset by the latest developments in the DPRK’s nuclear program and the failure of diplomacy at the six-party talks, the world was stunned, once again, with a new development: on February 13, 2007, “The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks” issued a statement that North Korea had agreed to a new arrangement. According to this, “yet another” historic agreement,

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility in sixty days, including the reprocessing facility, and invite back IAEA personnel for monitoring and verifications.
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs.
3. The DPRK and the United States will start bilateral talks aimed at solving issues between them and advance toward full diplomatic relations. In this context, the United States will begin the process of removing the DPRK from its state sponsor of terrorism list and terminate its application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to the DPRK.
4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations.
5. The parties agree to send economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. Initially, fifty thousand tons of heavy fuel oil will be given to DPRK within the next sixty days.60

During 2007 and 2008, there were major developments in the denuclearization of North Korea. In July 2007, North Korea shut down its Yongbyon reactor in return for fuel aid by the South. Next year in June, the country announced it dismantled the cooling tower of the same facility. In return, the United States removed North Korea from its state sponsors of terrorism list. However, with North Korea launching a rocket on April 5, 2009, U.S.–North Korean relations worsened again. Protesting the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the rocket launch, North Korea declared it would not participate in six-party talks and would not be bound by any agreement signed before. On May 25, 2009, North Korea made a second nuclear test, generating protests from all around the world. As of February 2010, there has not been a substantial development in U.S.–North Korean relations toward a resolution of the issue.

Critics of George W. Bush’s Policies

The international community welcomed the new 2007 agreement, but it was publicly criticized by U.S. policy makers across the political spectrum. The most frequently expressed objection was that, despite the fact that Republicans had voiced their contempt for the Agreed Framework of 1994 for a decade, the
new deal that the Bush administration agreed to looked almost identical to it; that is, North Korea would suspend its nuclear program in return for economic and diplomatic incentives by the other parties. Perhaps the only difference was that now North Korea seemed to have achieved greater nuclear capabilities than before. Therefore many analysts asked what had been the use of the confrontation policy that the Bush administration had followed for five years, which simply gave North Korea additional time to build more weapons. A South Korean regional expert’s comment was informative: “We have lost four or five years and now we have to start again with North Korea—except the situation is worse because they have now tested a nuclear device.”

Critics of the Bush administration were not the only ones dissatisfied with the agreement. John Bolton, a Republican and former U.S. ambassador to the UN, criticized the deal harshly: “It sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: If you hold out long enough and wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded. . . . It makes the [Bush] administration look very weak at a time in Iraq and dealing with Iran it needs to look strong.”

Many Republicans in Congress also criticized the deal on similar grounds.

The Bush administration rejected the assertion that the agreement was an example of appeasement because it was based only on staggered incentives. That is, if North Korea did not fulfill the requirements, it would not receive any economic or diplomatic concessions. However, one should also remember that the heavily criticized Agreed Framework was based on similar terms. In sum, it could be argued that the confrontation policy of the Bush administration ended up favoring the North Korean regime. Between 2007 and North Korea’s missile and nuclear device tests in 2009, the agreement seemed to work quite well. However, with apparent escalations from the North Korean side, the talks and dismantling of nuclear reactors have been curbed. A solution to the problem seems more difficult than before.

The Obama Administration and North Korea

In the first year of the Obama administration, North Korea did not appear to be at the top of the foreign policy agenda. Obama’s election rhetoric, i.e., engagement with hostile nations, took a setback with North Korea’s second nuclear test. Although Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton used harsh rhetoric and warned the country, President Obama and his administration seemed only to hope that North Korea would rejoin the six-party talks by itself.
Of course, the Obama administration inherited a multiparty diplomatic process from the previous administration that has been suspended due to the North’s behavior in early 2009. Yet the administration seemed to focus heavily on other issues such as Afghanistan, and did not seem to pay much attention to the Korean peninsula.

Conclusion: Options

North Korea’s nuclear status has been an issue of varying salience in U.S. foreign policy for the last two decades. Presidents have used a range of tactics, from the stick to the carrot and varying combinations thereof, to cope with North Korea’s quest for status as a nuclear power. It is not clear that any particular approach can be labeled an unqualified success. However, the dealings of various administrations with North Korea have one characteristic in common: their inclination to repeat the same mistakes over and over again: “U.S. administrations have a tendency to start from scratch in their dealings with North Korea—and then relearn, step by step, the tortuous lessons.”

The George W. Bush administration significantly changed U.S. policy on North Korean nuclear proliferation, replacing engagement with confrontation, which led to the breakdown of bilateral relations and undermined the gains of the Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea’s uncompromising attitude and provocative behavior did not help the situation. Opponents of the Clinton administration’s way of dealing with North Korea raised valid arguments concerning the likelihood that Pyongyang could be trusted to implement the framework and relinquish its quest for nuclear weapons. The Bush administration’s undermining of the Agreed Framework without providing a better alternative, however, hurt the United States and its allies. As North Korean vice foreign minister Kim Gye Gwan noted, North Korea can develop a nuclear arsenal without the limitations of any international agreement or monitoring: “As time passes, our nuclear deterrent continues to grow in quality and quantity.” Free from the limitations of the Agreed Framework, North Korea may have quadrupled its arsenal of nuclear weapons. Currently, North Korea is estimated to have six to eight nuclear bombs.

None of the options for the future is without difficulties. One option is to do nothing: accept the North as a nuclear power (as is done with India, Israel, and Pakistan) and hope not to aggravate the situation. That entails the danger of North Korea’s developing long-range missiles that can hit U.S. soil or selling nuclear material to terrorists. Moreover, allowing the North to have nuclear
weapons would set an unacceptable precedent for future cases of nuclear proliferation. Japan and South Korea, for example, might want to produce such weapons in response to the North Korean threat. The presence of multiple nuclear powers in Asia could lead to an enormously costly war in the region and place China in a difficult position in terms of choosing a side. Countries like Iran may also use North Korea as an example of legitimate nuclear programs.

Second, the North Korean nuclear facilities could be destroyed, if that is still feasible strategically. Such an action might cause collateral damage and radioactive fallout over China, Japan, and South Korea. Third, sanctions and international pressure, led by China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, could eventually pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear program. The North, however, already is being pressed hard, and escalation of such tactics could lead to another war on the Korean Peninsula.

The fourth option is trying to make the February 2007 deal work in a way that would provide assurances to the North Korean regime about its security and deliver the economic and diplomatic aid that the country desperately needs. This could fit into President Obama’s engagement policy promises during his election campaign. However, judging from two decades of U.S.–North Korean relations on the nuclear issue, no carrot policy seemed to work perfectly. North Korea as a military dictatorship prefers benefits of nuclear deterrence over economic and political gains. Perhaps a significant leadership change in North Korea may lead to positive developments. Therefore the United States and the rest of the world should closely observe who will be the next leader of North Korea after Kim Jong-Il, whose health has been reported to deteriorate in the last few years. Only a North Korean leader who really wants to cooperate can change the outcome. From U.S. foreign policy makers’ perspective, North Korea seems to be a nonsuccessful example.

Key Actors

**George H. W. Bush**  First U.S. president to deal with North Korea as a nuclear problem, employed a confrontation policy and avoided direct talks.

**George W. Bush**  President, publicly referred to the Korean leadership as part of a so-called axis of evil (along with Iran and Iraq), hastening the breakdown of relations and of implementation of the Agreed Framework.

**Jimmy Carter**  President, actions as a self-appointed ambassador to help ease tensions between the United States and North Korea in summer 1994 led to a resumption of talks that produced the Agreed Framework.
Bill Clinton  President, advocated engagement and direct negotiation with North Korea.

Robert L. Gallucci  Ambassador-at-large and chief U.S. negotiator during the 1994 crisis with North Korea.

International Atomic Energy Agency  UN agency that promotes safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies for member states; active in keeping the North Korean nuclear program in check.

Kim Il Sung  The “Great Leader” of North Korea from 1948 to 1994; chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party, which has ruled the country for more than five decades.

Kim Jong Il  The “Dear Leader” of North Korea since 1994; successor of Kim Il Sung, his father, and general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party and chairman of the National Defense Committee.

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization  Grouping of Japan, South Korea, and the United States, established in 1995 to advance implementation of the Agreed Framework; was to provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and light water reactors in return for dismantling its nuclear program.

William J. Perry  U.S. North Korea policy coordinator and special adviser to President Bill Clinton, reviewed North Korean policy in 1999.

Notes

2. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


20. Ibid., 46.


22. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*.

23. In terms of nonproliferation, light water reactors are preferred to the North Korean graphite-modulated reactors because producing the necessary waste for the development of nuclear weapons is much more difficult.


25. Ibid., 98.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 102.


29. Ibid.

30. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*.


34. Troester, *Jimmy Carter*.


41. Wilborn, “Strategic Implications.”
42. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 1.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
63. Scanlon, “The End of a Long Confrontation?”
65. Ibid.

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